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ABSTRACT
The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking
history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states
to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the
interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that
allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the strength of various interests
in the district for expanded banking competition. Unlike previous work, we find strong evidence of
elite influence. We find congressmen in districts in which landholdings were concentrated (suggesting
a landed elite), and where the cost of bank credit was high and its availability limited (suggesting limited
banking competition and high potential rents), were significantly more likely to oppose the act. The
evidence suggests that while the law and the overall regulatory structure can shape the financial system
far into the future, they themselves are likely to be shaped by well organized elites, even in countries
with benign political institutions.
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Constituencies or interest groups that arise from the pattern of land holdings or 
other forms of economic production in a country can shape important economic 
institutions such as the financial system, and consequently, economic development 
(Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, 2003), Haber (2005), Rajan and Ramcharan (2011)). But 
the channel through which interest groups might operate remains a matter of debate. 
Some (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)) argue that the 
mediating channel is political institutions, as elite interest groups create coercive political 
institutions that give them the power to hold back the development of economic 
institutions, such as finance, and hence economic growth. However, legislation, and its 
effects on perpetuating rents and hence political power, may be another principal channel 
through which constituencies might shape the financial system and project their influence 
through time, even in benign democratic political systems (see Do (2004), Glaeser, 
Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2004), or Mian et. al (2010), for example). 
In this paper, we study whether, and how, constituencies influence the 
development of the financial system, using evidence from congressional voting on the 
McFadden Act of 1927. The United States has long had a dual banking system, where 
state banks are chartered and regulated at the state level, while national banks operate 
under federal oversight. Before the McFadden Act, some states allowed state banks to 
open multiple branches, while others prohibited all branching. However, nationally 
chartered banks were, in all cases, not allowed to open branches (Cartinhour and 
Westerfield (1980), Southworth (1928)). As a result, an increasing number of national 
banks gave up their charter (which typically meant their leaving the Federal Reserve   2
System also).
2 The McFadden Act attempted to level the playing field by forcing states to 
accord largely the same branching rights to national banks as to state banks (Preston 
(1927)). It was the key piece of federal legislation regulating bank branching, and hence 
bank competition, in the United States for about 70 years—up until the passage of the 
Riegle-Neal Act in 1994. 
The act proved enormously controversial, and a study of how the vote of each 
congressional district varied with the constituencies in that district can be extremely 
informative on (1) whether constituencies had political influence; and (2) whether the 
influence was directed in expected ways for, or against, greater competition and financial 
development. Of course, there has already been an enormous amount of work on the 
political economy of the McFadden Act (see, for example, Economides, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1996)). Much of the work has examined whether legislators from states with unit 
banks voted disproportionately against the Act, and the results are mixed at best – for 
instance, Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996) find that the influence of the proportion 
of banks with branches in the state on the fraction of state representatives voting for 
branching is negative and insignificant (though they find that states with poorly 
capitalized state banks voted against branching).  
Our contribution is to dive deeper into the determinants of the constituencies 
against branching within state, taking the split between unit banking and branch banking 
                                                 
2 The Comptroller of Currency in 1922 observed: “National banks are compelled to compete with state 
institutions. If state laws are more liberal they will constitute an inducement to banks to operate under the 
laws of the states rather than the Nation…If the system is to be perpetuated there must be national banks in 
sufficient number and strength…they must be given charters liberal enough to remain in the system. The 
advantage of the more liberal conditions that can be enjoyed outside the national banking system…will 
presently become a menace to the strength, and may ultimately threaten the very existence, of the Federal 
Reserve System (Report of the Comptroller of Currency (1922)).   3
states, and more generally the prevailing financial structure and regulation (which has 
been the focus of previous work), as reflective of these deeper influences. This allows us 
to focus on a richer, and more detailed, pattern of interests than previously examined, as 
well as exploit within state differences in voting patterns. Unlike previous work, we find 
strong evidence of constituency influence on legislation.  
This then allows us to establish an important channel of constituency influence on 
the financial system, legislation, which is not pinned down in previous work. In Rajan 
and Ramcharan (2011), constituencies do appear to influence the structure of the 
financial sector. Specifically, landed elites—a key political constituency during this 
period--were successful in restricting local bank competition in different counties in the 
United States. Counties where the agricultural elite had disproportionately large land 
holdings had significantly fewer banks per capita, even correcting for state level effects. 
Moreover, credit appears to have been costlier, and access to it more limited, in these 
counties. 
The literature suggests three main reasons why landed interests might have 
opposed more local bank competition. First, limits on bank competition and control over 
exit could provide landowners insurance during periods of agricultural distress. While 
large national banks or state banks with branches could foreclose more easily on loans 
and exit the locality, transferring capital to urban or less distressed rural areas, small local 
banks would have fewer options, and would have to continue lending to large local 
farmers during periods of distress (Calomiris and Ramirez (2004)).  
Second, control over bank entry could accord landed interests greater influence 
over the local financial system, enabling them to prevent or delay the emergence of   4
alternative centers of economic power and status (Chapman (1934)). For example, a 
rapidly growing manufacturing sector could increase the returns to schooling and attract 
labor away from agriculture, and there is evidence that landed interests may have used 
their political influence to restrict not just finance, but education and other public goods 
(Galor et. al (2009), Ramcharan (2010)).
 3 
Third, large landowners generated surpluses which they could lend. They also 
often had a stake in, or influence over, the local bank. The entry of more formal credit 
institutions could be competition for their lending business. They also had indirect 
reasons to keep out competition in lending. Landowners often owned the local store. 
Tenants and small farmers needed credit to buy supplies from the local store. By limiting 
credit from alternative sources – for instance by keeping banks out -- the local merchant 
cum landlord could lock the farmer in and charge exorbitant prices, perpetuating the 
lucrative debt peonage system (Haney (1914, p55-56).
4 
5 
 There is, however, some 
                                                 
3 Alston and Ferrie (1993) argue that because landed interests wanted to maintain a paternalistic state in 
order to ensure a steady supply of farm labor, the Southern congressional delegation  systematically 
blocked the development of the federal welfare state in the U.S. until mechanization reduced the demand 
for unskilled labor.  
4 Initially, there was a conflict of interest between large landlords and the local merchant because both had 
an interest in tenant farmers. But “as time went on the two classes tended more and more to become one.” 
Landlords were drawn into the store business by “the desirability of supplying their tenants ”, while 
“storekeepers frequently became landowners by taking over the farms of those who were indebted to them 
or by direct purchase at the prevailing low price”. Hicks (1931, p32). Haney (1914, p54) writes that in most 
parts of central Texas, “over 90 percent of those tenants who owe the store are also indebted to their 
landlords for larger or smaller advances.” See also the surveys in Goodwyn (1978) and Ransom and Sutch 
(2001). 
5 There were other benefits for the rich landlord to limiting access. Landlords would also enjoy a 
competitive advantage, for instance by being able to buy land cheaply when small farmers were hit by 
adversity, or by having privileged access to loans in the midst of a prolonged drought.    5
controversy among economic historians about the extent of debt peonage and the 
“bankability” of tenant farmers and share croppers during this period.
6 
While we know the landed elite had the incentive and the ability to influence 
outcomes, we do not know whether their influence worked through the political process. 
For instance, Rajan and Ramcharan (2011) argue that landed elites could have shaped 
local bank competition by giving business to favored banks. Indeed, if politicians were 
strictly motivated by doing good for the mass of voters (the public interest view of 
legislation), it seems unlikely that they would have sided with the views of the landed 
interests. If, however, concentrated money power trumped dispersed voter interests, one 
might expect a district’s politicians to reflect the interests of the landed elite (the private 
interest view).
7 If so, we should see representatives of districts where landed elites were 
important vote disproportionately against the McFadden Act.   
The McFadden Act proposed to extend bank branching powers to national banks 
only in those states that already allowed state banks the right to open branches. 
Contemporary texts (see, for example, Preston (1927)) suggest that the expectation was 
that if the McFadden Act allowed national banks liberal branching powers, then 
                                                 
6 For example, the evidence in Fishback (1989) suggests that most farmers may have been able to repay 
their debts shortly after harvests. Also, while debt peonage is most closely associated with racial 
discrimination, Alston and Kauffman (2001) find little evidence of discrimination in sharecropper pay for a 
sample of southern counties. However, the most extreme versions of debt peonage (forced land sales 
because of distress, racial discrimination, etc.) need not apply for landowners cum storeowners to have an 
incentive to monopolize credit.  
7 There is evidence that local politicians had some influence over bank structure, over and above their votes 
on legislation. For example, members of Congress often influenced bank chartering decisions in their 
district. Referring to state charter applications, American Bankers Association (1935) quotes a Comptroller 
on political influence: “prior to the disposition of an application a copy thereof is sent to the national-bank 
examiner, to the Member of Congress for the district in which the bank is located, and to the superintendent 
of the state banking department, with request for information on the character and standing of the 
applicants, the existing demand for a bank at the locality, and an expression of opinion as to whether 
success is probable.”   6
subsequent to the passage of the act, national banks would unite with large state banks to 
push for branching in all states. Thus landed elites in non-branching states could be 
expected to be even more opposed to the McFadden Act than were landed elites in 
branching states, especially because the latter’s rents would already have been diminished 
by branching by state banks.  
The Act evolved in Congress as constituencies worked to influence the 
legislation. Examining the initial congressional roll call data, controlling for state fixed 
effects (which allow us to absorb state differences in regulations, among other factors), 
we find that congressmen from districts with more concentrated land holdings (our proxy 
for the relative importance of landed interests) were far more likely to oppose the 
McFadden Act during its first House vote in 1926. The results are stronger still when we 
instrument land concentration with a technological determinant of the optimal size of 
land holdings, the pattern of rainfall in the area. 
 The association of land concentration with congressional opposition was 
especially strong in those districts where agriculture was relatively more important than 
manufacturing, suggesting that landed elites were politically more effective when they 
also dominated economically. Similarly, the association of landed interests with 
congressional opposition was particularly strong in non-branching states, perhaps because 
of the fears of the local elite about the incipient spread of branching. 
Also, using hand collected data from the 1930 Census on measures of credit cost 
and access, such as the interest rate and loan to value ratios of farms, we find that 
congressional support for the McFadden Act, was significantly lower in those districts   7
with high credit costs and limited credit availability, suggesting that the desire to protect 
incumbents’ rents may have indeed inspired political opposition to the Act.  
We use the legislative history of the McFadden Act to help identify more 
precisely the role of landed interests in shaping its passage. Some of the more aggrieved 
landowners, especially those in smaller communities, were appeased by provisions that 
were introduced into the act limiting the ability of national banks to open branches in 
small towns. The historical commentary also suggests that political horse-trading in the 
House may have been key in securing the Act’s final passage, as government price 
support for grain was extended to cotton and tobacco, allegedly in order to entice the 
Southern delegation to support the McFadden Bill and break the deadlock with the Senate 
(the House disagreed with the Senate version that was more favorable towards bank 
competition). Consistent with this narrative, we find evidence that the association 
between congressional opposition and the strength of landed elites declined significantly 
in tobacco growing districts, ensuring the Act’s passage.  
Finally, using county level data, we explore the impact of the Act on local 
banking structures. There is evidence that in those states allowing branching, the Act’s 
passage did lead to faster national bank growth, and a decline in deposits held in state 
banks. The legislation thus had a significant impact on local bank structures. 
Eventually, technological changes in banking, which allowed banking at a 
distance, made it hard to maintain bank branching restrictions in the US (Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999)). The Riegle-Neal Act repealed the remaining restrictions on bank 
branching in 1994. A summary evaluation then is that by restricting the scope of the 
McFadden Act and protecting small banks from competition, landed interests   8
strengthened small community banks, which gained political influence and maintained 
the protections long after their initial protectors lost their economic and political heft.  
Thus constituencies can have influence long after they pass from the scene.  
 Ours is not the first paper to show that landed interests matter for financial 
development (see, for example, Rajan and Ramcharan (2011), and Vollrath (2009)). 
While Rajan and Ramcharan (2011) argue that landed interests have influence that helps 
them restrict local bank entry and competition, they do not provide evidence of such 
influence working through political channels and congressional votes. The pattern of 
voting on the McFadden Act helps us establish the necessary link between landed 
interests and political influence. 
Finally, there is an extensive literature on the political economy of banking 
legislation more generally (for recent examples, see Acharya, van Nieuwerburgh, 
Richardson and White (2011), Brown and Dinc (2005), Dinc (2005), Cetorelli and 
Strahan (2006),  Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010), or Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011)). Our 
contribution to the widely accepted finding that narrow directly-affected interest groups 
influence legislation is to demonstrate the influence of deeper (possibly technologically-
determined) constituencies that drove one of the most salient pieces of financial 
legislation in U.S. history.   
In the next section we briefly describe the Act. We describe the data in section III, 
the main results are in section IV, we discuss the impact of the act on bank structures in 
section V, and then conclude.      9
I.   THE MCFADDEN ACT 
  The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did not grant national banks branching rights. 
National bank regulators therefore feared that the national banks would not be 
competitive with state banks in states that allowed state banks branching powers. The 
Comptroller of the Currency ruled in 1922 that national banks could open intra-city 
offices for the purpose of collecting deposits when this did not conflict with state laws 
(see White (1985)). Two days after the Comptroller’s ruling, the First National Bank of 
St. Louis opened a full-fledged branch and argued that, as a federally chartered 
institution, it was not subject to state regulation. Two years later, the Supreme Court 
ruled against it, but the fight had been joined.  
Fearing that once the national banks got branching powers, they would join large 
state banks in pressing for branch banking in every state, banks in many of the unit 
banking states formed state associations that declared themselves opposed to branch 
banking. On the national level, the United States Bankers Association Opposed to Branch 
Banking was formed. Unit bankers pressed their state legislatures to remove any 
ambiguity about whether branching banking was prohibited, and by 1924, nine states 
added anti-branching provisions to their banking laws.       
The McFadden Act was motivated by the federal government’s desire to resolve 
the ambiguity about the powers of national banks, and preserve the attractiveness of 
national bank charters and membership in the nascent Federal Reserve System against 
regulatory competition from state bank regulators.  It provided that in states where state 
branch banking existed, or could exist in the future, both national and state bank members 
of the Federal Reserve System would be allowed to operate branches within the city   10
limits of the parent bank. This was viewed as a step towards further branching 
liberalization and greater bank competition at the local level.  
The local political constituencies who had historically guarded their control of the 
banking system saw their rents threatened by the prospect of increased competition and 
the potential dominance of local banking by large national banks. Moreover, as discussed 
above, they feared that the Act would lead to more states opening up to branching.  
Opposition to branching was also intense in those areas with many small unit banks. The 
1920s was a period of agricultural distress, and rural small bank failures became 
increasingly common. These unit bankers feared that the introduction of bank branching 
and the entry of large national banks into small towns could accelerate small bank 
failures. The Mid West, especially Chicago, heavily populated with small unit banks, 
became the epicenter of opposition to the McFadden Act (see Chapman and Westerfield 
(1980), Southworth (1928), White (1985)).  
As an aside, we should note that while the landed elite may have been concerned 
by the pro-competitive aspects of the McFadden Act, Populist forces may have pushed 
for preserving unit banking because it limited the power of distant bankers. Politics 
makes strange bedfellows -- different constituencies may make common cause over 
regulations because they like different aspects of it, even though the constituencies 
fundamentally oppose each other. Moreover, popular populist policies – keep banking 
local – may capture the public’s imagination even if they are not broadly good for the 
populace, or framed with their interests in mind. Our detailed examination of district-by-
district voting patterns can help us focus on local influences, which may be lost if we 
were to examine state-level voting patterns, as some previous studies have done.     11
The Act went through several metamorphoses in Congress, as the various 
constituencies sought to influence the legislation. In its original form, before February of 
1926, the branching issue was phrased in language widely viewed as favoring further 
branching and local competition.
 8  But the Hull amendment, which delayed the Act’s 
passage amid much controversy, sought to “limit bank branching to those States which 
permitted branch banking at the time of the approval of the bill—so far as the national 
banking and the Federal Reserve Systems are concerned.” In so doing, the amendment 
was intended to preserve the coalition against the spread of branching, thus allowing the 
act to obtain support from unit-banking states. That is, the Hull amendment would ensure 
that any subsequent legislation to permit branching would encounter three-fold 
opposition from (1) national banks that could not now have branches in those states (2) 
the state bank members of the Federal Reserve System, who also could not have any 
branches in those states (3) and of course, the incumbent unit bankers. The Hull 
amendment was dropped from the final bill before it passed.  
In sum, the sections pertaining to branching in the Act were vigorously contested, 
right from the Act’s introduction in the House in 1922 through its final passage in 1927, 
which was assured only after the Senate invoked a cloture motion for the third time in its 
history at that point. The Act was signed into law by President Coolidge in February 
1927.
  
Clearly, unit banks were opposed to the Act. But what interests lay behind the unit 
banks? As we argue in the introduction and in Rajan and Ramcharan (2011), landed 
                                                 
8 Specifically, this version of the Act “provided that state bank members of the Federal Reserve System 
might not establish branches outside their home cities and that national banks might establish branches in 
their home cities in those states where state banks were accorded a like privilege ”Collins, “Report on the 
Bank Branching Question”, pp 82-83.   12
agrarian interests were strongly opposed to any reforms perceived to be fostering more 
local bank competition. In what follows, we will attempt to tease out the role of these 
deeper interests in opposing competition.   
II.   DATA 
A. LAND CONCENTRATION 
 
What could be a proxy for the strength of landed interests and their desire to limit 
access to finance?  In any of these hypotheses where there is a group of larger farmers 
who “exploit”, there has to be another group of small farmers or tenants who are 
explicitly “exploited” (as in the debt peonage hypothesis) or are implicitly “exploited” 
(for instance, if they contribute savings to the local pool but do not get loans in a 
downturn because their access to finance is deliberately left underdeveloped, as in 
Calomiris and Ramirez (2004)). One measure of the strength of these two constituencies 
is the Gini coefficient of land farmed, which measures the degree of inequality of land 
holdings. If land holdings are very unequal, large landowners could have both the ability 
and incentive to limit access to finance, while if land holdings are relatively equal 
(whether uniformly large or small), no one has the power or the interest to alter access for 
others.
9  
Our measure of the concentration of land holdings is based on the distribution of 
farm sizes as in Rajan and Ramcharan (2011). The data are collected by the U.S. Census 
Bureau at the county level for 1920. A farm is defined as “all the land which is farmed by 
                                                 
9 This presupposes, of course, that those without land either do not have the basic minimum surplus to be 
worth squeezing (such as field hands) or live in towns, far from the sphere of influence of the landlords. We 
will show that a greater fraction of activity in manufacturing (a measure of non-land activity) does diminish 
the effect of land concentration on opposition to the Act.   13
one person, either by his own labor alone or with the assistance of members of his 
household or hired hands”. Note that a tenant is also a farmer by this definition. We have 
information on the number of farms falling within particular acreage categories or bins, 
ranging from below 3 acres up to 1000 acres.  Assuming the midpoint of each bin is the 
average size of farms in that bin, we construct the Gini coefficient to summarize the farm 
acreage data (see Appendix for a precise formula and definitions). The Gini coefficient is 
a measure of concentration that lies between 0 and 1, and higher values indicate that 
farms at both ends of the size distribution account for a greater proportion of total 
agricultural land—that is, the holding of agricultural land is unequally distributed.  
In 1920, the average Gini coefficient of a county is 0.426, the 99
th percentile 
county is at 0.687, the 1
st percentile county is at 0.2, and the standard deviation is 0.10. 
The correlation between the Gini for a county and the share of agricultural land in small 
farms (below 20 acres) is positive, as is the correlation with the share in large farms 
(above 175 acres). The correlation between the Gini and the share in medium sized farms 
(between 20 acres and 175 acres) is negative. Thus counties with high Gini coefficients 
tend, as we would expect, to have more land in both small, as well as large, farms. 
Interestingly, as a result of the greater weight in small farms, counties with Gini above 
median have smaller farms on average than counties with Gini below median.  
This pattern of correlations between the Gini coefficient and farm sizes suggest 
that agricultural production might have been increasingly dominated by a landed elite in 
those counties with a higher Gini coefficient. Figure 1 indicates that the Southern and 
Border counties, areas known for plantation agriculture, generally had higher Gini 
coefficients than elsewhere. Similarly, the correlations in Table 2 suggest that areas with   14
high levels of land concentration tended to have higher levels of rainfall, a key 
requirement for plantation crops like cotton and sugar; counties with higher Gini 
coefficients also tended to specialize less in grain and other crops more suited to 
independent smaller family farms, given the technologies of the era (see Ramcharan 
(2010) and the references contained therein). All this also suggests that land 
concentration was determined substantially by technological forces outside finance.       
B.   Congressional District Votes   
The McFadden Act was first introduced into the 69
th Congress on Feb 4
th, 1926. 
There is a weak positive correlation between the percent of a state’s congressional 
delegation that voted against the Act and the average level of land concentration within 
that state in 1920. But the voting behavior of House members, in contrast to the Senate, is 
designed to reflect the interests of local constituents rather than aggregate state level 
issues, and we focus more systematically on the district level voting data (see Rusk 
(2001) and references contained therein).  
To this end, we merge the detailed county level data on land concentration and 
other demographic, geographic, and economic variables with the congressional district 
voting data on the McFadden Act. There are about 3000 counties surveyed in 1920 
Census, but only 427 districts in the 69
th Congress, which were apportioned based on the 
population estimates from the 1920 Census. In about 330 cases there is a direct 
correspondence between congressional districts and counties: one or more whole counties 
are aggregated into a single district. In these cases, we construct the district level data by 
aggregating the “whole” county level data using basic measures of central tendency such 
as the mean and weighted by each county’s relative size in the district. For instance, the   15
First congressional district of Maine is comprised of both Cumberland and York counties, 
and we use the population weighting scheme: each county’s characteristic is attributed to 
the First district in proportion to the county’s relative population in the district. 
However, for about 20 districts, counties have either been split into several 
districts, or pieces of various counties and towns have been combined to form a district. 
We call these cases “splits” and they primarily occur in urban areas. For example, 
Manhattan (New York county ) was “split” or divided into 11 different districts in the 
69
th Congress. For county level data in the “split” districts, we simply ascribe the 
county’s characteristics uniformly to those districts contained within the county (Adler 
(2002)). Some districts were however formed from towns and were omitted from the 
sample as there is no correspondence with county level data. We are thus left with a 
sample of 354 congressional districts.  
 In Table 3A, we decompose the initial vote on Feb 4
th, 1926, and this suggests 
that the voting pattern in the available sample of districts is similar to the full roll call 
data – 66 percent voted Yea and 23 percent voted Nay in the available sample versus 67 
percent and 21 percent respectively in the full roll call vote. And while 80 percent of 
House Republicans and only 47 percent of the Democrats voted in favor of the act, this 
difference in support across party lines largely reflected varying regional economic 
interests rather than ideological differences (Southworth (1928)). For instance, from 
Table 3B we see that opposition was mainly concentrated in the agrarian South, and parts 
of the upper mid West. 
The correlation between land concentration and a “Nay” vote is 0.17, which is 
significant at the 5 percent level. Also, Figure 2, which plots the distribution of land   16
concentration by ”Yea” and “Nay” votes, suggests that House members from districts 
with a greater similarity in the size of land holdings—“more equal counties”—were far 
more likely to vote in favor of the legislation than those from more unequal districts. 
These differences across the two distributions are significant at the one percent level. Of 
course, this non parametric evidence is only suggestive; omitted demographic, 
geographic, and economic variables might explain the motivation for opposition to the 
Act, rather than simply the influence of landed interests. We thus use the legislative 
history of the Act to understand the role of landed interests in shaping the legislation. 
III.   RESULTS: LAND CONCENTRATION AND THE MCFADDEN ACT 
A. THE INITIAL BILL, 1926 
 To this end, in the first two columns in Table 4A we use a simple linear 
probability model to measure the relationship between land concentration within a 
congressional district and the probability that the district’s representative voted against 
the McFadden Act in its initial form on February 4
th 1926. Specifically, omitting the 
abstentions and paired votes, the dependent variable equals 1 if a congressman voted 
against the act, and 0 if he voted “Yea”. We also include state-level indicator variables in 
all specifications to control for the potential impact of state level factors on the House 
vote. These correct for state level differences in regulations such as unit versus branch 
banking and presence of deposit insurance, as well as other differences such as average 
capital levels (Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996)) that the prior literature has 
focused on.
10  
                                                 
10 The bicameral nature of the Congress and the design of House terms are intended to make House 
members more responsive to local interests than the Senate, but aggregate state and regional factors might 
still affect House voting patterns. For example, state level “machine” politics might sway the House 
delegation from a given state to vote in a particular way. Likewise, broad regional interests—the Mid West   17
Consistent with the non-parametric evidence, there is a statistically significant and 
large positive relationship between the probability of a “Nay” vote and land concentration 
in column 1. A one standard deviation increase in land concentration is associated with a 
0.05 increase in the probability of observing a “Nay” vote; recall that the unconditional 
probability of a “Nay” vote in the sample is 0.26.  
There are, of course, important district-level differences we should correct for. 
We include a broad array of geographic and demographic controls in Table 4A column 2. 
Waterways were centers of economic activity as well as transportation (and if freshwater, 
of irrigation). For instance, waterways such as the Great Lakes in the upper mid west, and 
the Atlantic Ocean along the East coast helped spur industrialization and the demand for 
financial services in those regions (Pred (1966)). And including these variables help 
control for plausibly exogenous determinants of a district’s prosperity and the kind of 
economic activity it might undertake. The socioeconomic controls include: the fraction of 
the district’s population that is illiterate, the fraction that is young, and the fraction that is 
black. Also included are the log of district population, as well as the fraction of the 
population that is urban (reflecting the fact that urban interests vis a viz banking might 
have differed from rural groups).  
In addition, we also include as controls the ideology index developed by Poole 
and Rosenthal (2007) for each congressman voting on the Act. The first dimension of the 
index is generally interpreted as the congressman’s preference for redistribution—liberal 
or conservative bias. The second dimension focuses on urban relative to agrarian biases. 
Since both dimensions probably influenced voting on the act, we include both indices, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and South were far more agrarian than other parts of the country—could also sway the voting behavior of a 
state’s House delegation (Rusk (2001)).   18
recognizing that we may be overcorrecting since the landed elite might well determine 
the ideological preferences of the congressman in power. In this, our baseline 
specification, the coefficient estimate on land concentration in Table 4 column 2 nearly 
doubles, and remains significant at the 5 percent level.  
The concentration of land holdings might be related to the value of land 
ownership itself, and there is some evidence that the value of landownership may have 
directly affected preferences for different types of bank structures. For example, 
Calomiris and Ramirez (2004) find evidence that unit banking was more likely in states 
with higher farm wealth, suggesting that the returns to preserving local bank lending 
might have been higher in those states where land was more valuable. In column 3, we 
control for the per capita farm wealth within the congressional district—the value of land, 
crops, buildings and implements divided by the farm population. The coefficient estimate 
on land concentration increases slightly in magnitude, suggesting it is not a proxy for per-
capita farm wealth. Interestingly, per capital farm wealth, while positive, is not 
statistically significant. Also, because the land concentration measure does not 
distinguish between forms of ownership, in results available upon request, we control for 
the share of tenant farmers within the congressional district. This variable is not 
significant (p-value=0.63), while the land concentration coefficient is largely unchanged 
relative to column 2. 
Land concentration may not be exogenous to banking structure. For instance, 
areas with small, and relatively few, banks may have relatively concentrated banking 
markets, which in turn may result in land concentration. Put differently, our discussion 
above has been based on an assumption that land concentration is the deeper driving   19
variable. To address concerns about this assumption (and to place identification on firmer 
ground), we exploit the variation in land concentration that can arise from the plausibly 
exogenous variation in rainfall.  
Rainfall patterns can shape the pattern of agricultural production. Plantation 
crops, such as cotton and sugar, are better suited to areas with plentiful rainfall, while 
wheat and grain, which were often grown on smaller more uniform plot sizes during this 
period, thrive in areas with less precipitation (Gardner (2002), Tomich, Kilby and 
Johnston (1995) and the references in Rajan and Ramcharan (2011)). Consistent with 
these ideas, there is a large first stage conditional correlation between land concentration 
and the log average rainfall in the district—reported in the notes to Table 4A.  
In column 4, we use average rainfall as an instrument for land concentration. The 
IV results are less precisely estimated (p-value=0.09), but the coefficient is about 80 
percent larger than the OLS estimate in column 2. As a robustness check, in column 5, 
we include both the average rainfall, as well as its standard deviation jointly as 
instruments. The latter is a common measure of weather risk, and has also been shown to 
affect the pattern of land holdings in the United States during this period (Ramcharan 
(2010)). As described in the notes to Table 4A, both variables are individually and jointly 
positively associated with land concentration. The estimates for instrumented land 
concentration in columns 4 and 5 are similar, and the over-identification test that the 
availability of two instruments permits us lends some plausibility to the exclusion 
restriction assumption, suggesting that land concentration in the district may have played 
an economically important role in shaping voting outcomes.    20
While the results using the rainfall instrument are reassuring about the direction of 
causality, congressional districts club together areas with varied rainfall patterns. This 
introduces noise, which is especially problematic when we split the sample, as some 
robustness tests require. Therefore, in the robustness exercises that follow, we will revert 
to the more conservative OLS estimates, though IV estimates are available on request.   
In Table 4B, we perturb the baseline specification in a number of different ways 
in order to better understand the role of landed interests on voting outcomes. The relative 
economic clout of agrarian interests within a district might affect their ability to influence 
the political process. During this period the manufacturing sector, an important consumer 
of financial services, was growing, and becoming increasingly politically powerful. And 
in those districts where the economic power of the agricultural sector was offset by the 
power of the manufacturing sector, the influence of land concentration on congressional 
voting behavior might have been more muted.  Conversely, in districts in which landed 
interests were the dominant economic power, they would likely wield greater political 
power, and thus, have greater influence over congressional district voting behavior.  
We thus exploit the variation in the underlying economic structure across districts 
in order to understand better the possible role of landed interests and other constituencies 
in shaping the legislation. One measure of the relative economic power of the 
manufacturing sector is the ratio of the value of manufacturing output to the value of 
manufacturing and agriculture output in 1920. In Table 4B Column 1, we include the 
interaction between manufacturing share and land concentration in our baseline 
regression, taking care to include manufacturing share and its square directly. The 
estimates suggest that the positive impact of land concentration on congressional   21
opposition to the Act was significantly more muted in those districts in which 
manufacturing was economically more important. For a district at the 25 percentile share 
of manufacturing in output, a one standard deviation increases in land concentration is 
associated with a 0.18 increase in the probability of observing a “Nay” vote. However, 
for a district at the 75 percentile, with a relatively economically important manufacturing 
base, a similar change in land concentration suggests only a 0.12 increase in the 
probability of a “No”.
11  
National banks obviously stood to gain from the Act’s passage, possibly at the 
expense of small state unit banks, and we next explore the association between the  
existing structure of the local banking system and local political support for the act. In 
Table 4 Column 2, we include the share of national banks in total banks within the 
district in 1920 (and thus unaffected by the Act’s passage in 1927). The coefficient 
estimate indicates that congressional opposition to the Act was significantly attenuated in 
those districts in which national banks were more dominant in the local banking system. 
A one standard deviation increase in this share suggests a 0.05 decline in the probability 
of observing a “Nay” vote.  
Clearly, districts with few banks or with smaller banks may have been 
differentially disposed to vote on the legislation. To proxy for the relative number of such 
banks, we include the per capita number of state banks, and to proxy for bank size, we 
include the average value of deposits in each state bank in the district in Table 4B 
                                                 
11 Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that the extent of manufacturing share (or of national bank 
share, see below) was endogenous – areas where agrarian interests were stronger held back financial 
development and hence industrialization. This is not inconsistent with our point that the extent of 
industrialization is a proxy for the political power of agrarian interests, which is all we want to draw from 
this exercise.    22
Column 3. Of course, these “explanatory” variables are endogenous since we have argued 
that bank structure is shaped by landed interests, and we must be careful in drawing 
strong conclusions from this exercise. Nevertheless, it is interesting that in Table 4B 
Column 3, the coefficient on land concentration remains significant, and increases in 
magnitude.  
The debate over the McFadden Act occurred against a backdrop of banking sector 
distress in the country side, as many small state banks failed during the 1920s bust in 
commodity prices. This distress could perhaps have shaped preferences over regulations, 
and also affected the relative power of the various interest groups in the battle over the 
act. In Column 4, we include the state bank suspension rate over the period 1921-25 to 
help proxy for financial sector distress within the congressional district. The coefficient 
for land concentration remains significantly positive, while the bank suspension rate is 
negative and not significant.
12  
  Pre-existing state level branching regulations may also illustrate the impact of 
local constituencies on congressional support. Specifically, while the McFadden Act was 
in part focused on equalizing the regulatory environment surrounding branching between 
national and state banks, it was viewed by its opponents more generally as a fundamental 
step towards more widespread bank branching. Thus, opposition to the McFadden Act 
among local constituencies would have been expected to even be more vigorous in those 
                                                 
12 That we do not find these district level factors to matter does not mean they have no influence on a 
congressman’s attitude. To the extent that a state adopts a common position, say because of widespread 
state-level distress, it will be reflected in the state vote. Our test is calibrated to pick up the incremental 
constituency position.   23
states that did not already permit branching, fearing that the Act’s passage would 
embolden supporters of branching.
 13  
We explore this hypothesis in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4B, estimating separately 
the baseline specification for the subsample of districts located in states that did allow 
bank branching in 1920 (column 5), and those that did not allow branching (column 6). 
Among the unit banking states, the impact of land concentration on the probability of 
observing a “Nay” vote is about two thirds higher than the overall sample in column 2 of 
Table 4A, suggesting that in those states already opposed to branching and concerned 
about its spread, the influence of local land interests on the vote appeared to have been 
substantial. In contrast, the land concentration coefficient in the subsample of states 
allowing branching is considerably smaller, and not significant.  
Several states shifted to branching in the 1920s, while a few passed more 
restrictive branching laws during the decade (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2008)). 
However, the observed differences in estimates are qualitatively similar if we use 
branching regulations observed in 1930 (columns 7 and 8).  
 This larger positive association between land concentration and the likelihood of 
voting against the Act in non-branching states suggests that perhaps the incentives of 
landed interests to oppose the Act may have been especially strong in those states that did 
not have branching in the 1920s. Equally, the forces for branch banking (and hence for 
                                                 
13 State regulators themselves may have had an interest in the act, as the possible expansion of national 
banks and branching may have affected regulatory rents. There is for example some evidence that features 
of the state regulatory system may have been designed for rent seeking at the expense of stability in the 
1930s (Mitchener (2007)). However, we find no evidence that measures of the state regulatory system, 
from data kindly provided by Kris Mitchener, such as the length of the supervisor’s term and whether the 
supervisor had the power to charter or liquidate banks, shaped congressional opposition to the act—these 
results are available upon request.      24
McFadden) may have been inherently weaker in these states, which is why they did not 
have branch banking in the first place. Indeed, Rajan and Ramcharan (2011) find that 
states with more concentrated landholdings were less likely to have bank branching. It is 
not possible for us to tell apart the greater desire and incentive in unit banking states to 
oppose the act from the possibility that anti-branching advocates were more influential in 
those states. 
  
Cost and Availability of Credit 
Our hypothesis is that the opposition to the McFadden Act was largely driven by 
the desire of incumbents to preserve the local market structure in order to protect rents. 
We now investigate this hypothesis more directly. We collected by hand several county 
level indicators of local land mortgage loans from the 1930 US Census archives. We have 
the average interest on farm mortgages held by banks, a proxy for the cost of credit. We 
also have data on the fraction of indebted farms, and the debt to value ratio for farms. 
Finally, we have the amount of bank mortgage credit, which when scaled by local state 
bank deposits, gives us a credit to deposit ratio, a standard measure of local credit 
activity.  
Of course, it is possible to argue against each of these variables taken alone as a 
measure of local rents – they could be a measure of effective demand, as determined both 
by the need for credit as well as the creditworthiness of the borrower. However, assuming 
the underlying distribution of creditworthiness after correcting for economic, geographic, 
and demographic variables is the largely similar across counties, the simultaneous 
prevalence of lower interest rates and higher credit volumes is more consistent with 
higher supply and less rents. The simple correlations in Table 5 suggest that counties with   25
lower interest rates also had a greater fraction of indebted farms and higher loan to value 
ratios. To focus further on common supply side factors, we extract the principal 
component from our four proxies for access to credit. The first component explains about 
41% of the variance in the data, nearly twice as much as the second component. 
Moreover, it correlates negatively with interest rates and positively with the proxies for 
credit volume; the share of indebted farms, the debt to value ratio, and the mortgage 
credit to deposit ratio, suggesting that the first component might be a useful summary 
measure of local credit supply conditions.  
In Table 6A, we examine the impact of these credit variables on voting outcomes. 
There is evidence that congressmen in districts with higher interest rates and less credit 
availability were more likely to vote against the Act. In Table 6A Column 1, for example, 
a one standard deviation increase in the interest rate is associated with a 0.21 increase in 
the probability of a “Nay” vote. However, the statistical significance of these estimates is 
generally weak. We should note that since these credit variables are observed about three 
years after Act’s passage, they could reflect the impact of the Act rather than simple rent 
preservation.  
To address this issue, we instrument the 1930 district level credit variables with 
1920 land concentration. Land concentration in 1920 is observed well before the Act’s 
introduction in Congress, and it can be taken as predetermined. There is also substantial 
evidence that landed interests restrained the number of banks in order to restrict credit 
and make it more expensive at the county level (see Rajan and Ramcharan (2011)). When 
conditioned on a wide array of district level observables, the 1920 land concentration 
variable is also likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction assumption.    26
In Table 6B, the IV estimates using land concentration as an instrument are 
uniformly significant and economically large. A one standard deviation increase in the 
fraction of indebted farms within the district (signifying greater availability of credit) is 
associated with a decline in the probability of observing congressional opposition to the 
Act by 0.2. A similar increase in state bank lending, scaled by deposits, suggests a 0.46 
drop in the probability of a “Nay” vote, suggesting that congressional opposition to the 
Act was significantly more likely in districts with less credit availability. The coefficient 
on the principal component—the summary measure of district credit supply conditions—
is also negative and statistically significant.   
To gauge the robustness of this identification strategy, in column 6 we use 
average rainfall as an instrument. The coefficient estimate for the principal component is 
nearly identical to column 5, though less precisely estimated. The noisier estimates may, 
as we have argued, result from the noise introduced by aggregating rainfall across a 
district.   
In sum, districts where credit was less easily available, and more costly when 
available, tended to vote against the act, even though its primary intent was to level the 
playing field and increase bank competition.  
B.   Final House Roll Call, Jan 1927 
The House bill that was initially passed contained the Hull amendments which 
“…limit branch banking to those States which permitted branch banking at the time of 
the approval of the bill – so far as the national banking and the Federal Reserve System 
are concerned.” This was an attempt to defang the opposition of the congressmen from 
unit-banking states, who were worried that national banks and state bank members of the   27
Federal Reserve System might join hands after the passage of the Act to push for branch 
banking in their states. By limiting the branching powers of national banks to only those 
states that allowed branch banking at the time of the Act, national banks elsewhere would 
continue to have an incentive to oppose branch banking.    
The Senate Committee eliminated both the Hull amendments as well as some 
limitations on post-Act branching imposed on state members of the Federal Reserve 
System. In May 1926, the Senate passed the bill in its Senate Committee form. The 
differences between the House and the Senate were finally overcome when the House 
adopted a resolution on Jan 24
th 1927, accepting all the important amendments to the bill 
made by the Senate Committee. Bitter recriminations followed.  
It was alleged that advocates of the bill in the House had made a deal with 
supporters of farm-relief legislation.  Specifically, it was alleged that the McNary-
Haugen Farm Bill, which originally included government price support for grain, was 
extended to cotton and tobacco allegedly in order to entice the Southern delegation to 
support the McFadden Bill. Price supports for plantation crops would have greatly 
benefitted landed interests, especially those in plantation districts. We now investigate the 
role of landed interests in explaining the switch in the House position on the Hull 
Amendment, which led to the Act’s passage.  
In Table 7 column 1, the dependent variable is 1 if the representative voted 
against the final vote in favor of the Senate’s position on the bill (Jan 24
th). At first 
glance, there is little significant relationship between the vote and land concentration in 
the district and in fact, the coefficient estimate is negative. But, we now focus on the 
switching decision. To this end, we create an indicator variable that equals 1 if a House   28
member switched his vote from opposing the compromise proposition in place of the 
Hull Amendment on June 24, 1926 (which was agreed in the Senate-House conference 
committee in an attempt to reconcile the two versions of the bill) to finally accepting the 
Senate compromise on January 24, 1927. The indicator variable equals 0 if there was no 
change in the member’s position across the two votes. In column 2, there is a robust 
positive association between the probability of vote switching and land concentration.   
Of course, the concentration of agrarian land holdings is most often associated 
with plantation crops such as tobacco. And to examine whether the inclusion of such 
crops in the McNary-Haugen Farm Bill led to the change in support for the McFadden 
Act, we turn to the 1910 Agricultural Census, which records detailed county level data on 
crop values, including the value of tobacco grown—cotton values are not available. We 
aggregate these data up to the congressional district level, and create the share of tobacco 
in the value of total crops grown in the district. We interact this variable with land 
concentration, and include it both linearly and through a squared term to control for any 
direct impact it might have on explaining the switch. Finally, we present separate 
estimates for states that allowed branching and those that did not.  
The results are striking. Among the non branching states (Table 7 Column 3), 
where opposition to the Senate’s weakening of the Hull Amendment was most 
concentrated, the interaction term between land concentration and the value of tobacco 
grown in the district from the 1910 census is positive and significant; the individual linear 
terms are also significant at the one percent level. For a district at the median level of 
tobacco intensity, a one standard deviation increase in land concentration is associated 
with a 0.22 increase in the probability that the Congressman switched his vote. However,   29
for a district dominated by tobacco—one at the 90 percent level of tobacco intensity—a 
similar increase in land concentration suggests a 0.28 increase in the probability of 
observing a switch from a “Nay” on the June 26, 1926 compromise intended to reconcile 
the Senate and House versions of the act, to a “Yea” in January 1927, ensuring final 
passage.  
For the branching states, where the Hull amendment would have played little part, 
there is no evidence that tobacco played a significant role in explaining the limited 
switching observed in those districts (Table 7 Column 4), though the coefficient estimates 
have their expected signs.
14  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that in order to protect their rents, landed 
interests opposed the McFadden Act, and were able to influence the congressional vote, 
especially in those districts in which they held greater economic clout. But in exchange 
for the possibility of lucrative price supports for key crops, landed interest were in the 
end willing to acquiesce on bank competition. We next examine the impact of the Act’s 
passage on the local bank structure.  
IV.   RESULTS: IMPACT OF MCFADDEN ACT ON LOCAL BANK STRUCTURES 
The previous section has showed that landed interests were pivotal constituencies 
in influencing the vote on the McFadden Act. Were the fears of enhanced competition 
correct? Among those states that already had branching, did the Act’s passage redress the 
disadvantage that national banks had vis a vis state banks?  
To address this question, we turn to county level data on banks over the period 
1921-1930. In Table 8 Column 1, we use the log change in the average number of 
                                                 
14 We also replicate this switching analysis for the final 1927 vote with respect to the February 4
th 1926 
vote. The results are qualitatively similar.      30
national banks over the period 1927-1930, relative to 1926—the year before the Act’s 
passage as the dependent variable. We exclude the post 1930 period, which was highly 
unstable. The branching indicator variable equals 1 for those counties located in states 
permitting branching before the Act’s passage, and 0 otherwise. The estimate in Table 8 
Column 1 suggests that after the Act’s passage, the number of national banks was about 
3.1 percentage points higher relative to 1926 in those counties located in branching states. 
Column 2 includes our standard county-level demographic and geographic controls, and 
here the estimated impact of the Act is larger and more precisely estimated at 4.4 
percentage points.  
To discern whether the apparent impact of the Act on national banks might have 
been part of a broader trend, affecting state banks as well, we include the change in the 
share of national banks within the county as the dependent variable in Table 8 Column 3. 
The coefficient estimate suggests the share of national banks increased after the Act’s 
passage in counties located in states that had bank branching, suggesting that the Act 
disproportionately affected national banks in those branching counties.   
Does the increase in national bank shares after the Act’s passage stem from new 
national bank entrants rather than the failure of state banks? To check this, the dependent 
variable in Table 8 column 4 is the failure rate of state banks, defined as the ratio of state 
bank failures to the number of state banks the previous year, and averaged over the 1927-
1930 period. After controlling for county level characteristics, including the state bank 
failure rate in 1926, there is no evidence that the state bank failure rate was higher in 
counties permitting branching during the 1927-1930 period. This suggests that new   31
national bank entry, rather than disproportionate state bank failure, was responsible for 
the increase in national bank share.   
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the role of constituencies in shaping the development of 
the financial system, using evidence from congressional voting on the McFadden Act of 
1927. This act regulated the relationship between state and national banks in the United 
States for decades, and at the time, it was viewed as a precursor to more widespread bank 
branching, engendering opposition from rural interests and incumbent banks concerned 
about greater competition and a diminution of rents.  
Unlike previous work, our focus on the deeper political determinants of financial 
structure allows us to establish evidence of constituency influence. We find that House 
representatives from districts with more concentrated land holdings (our proxy for the 
relative importance of landed interests) were far more likely to oppose the McFadden Act 
during its first House vote in January 1926. The association of land concentration with 
congressional opposition was especially strong in those districts where agriculture was 
relatively more important than manufacturing, suggesting that landed elites were 
politically more effective when they also dominated economically. Measures of the size 
of incumbent rents, such as the interest rate, also positively predicted congressional 
opposition. And consistent with historical narratives suggesting that political horse 
trading eventually led to the act’s passage, there is evidence that landed interests 
supported the act in exchange for key agricultural price supports – interestingly 
temporary relief measures bought support that had long term effects through legislation.   32
Finally, examining the immediate impact of the act, we find evidence of greater national 
bank entry in those states that permitted branching.  
These results suggest that the constituencies or interest groups that arise from the 
technology of economic production can shape important economic institutions by using 
existing political institutions and the legislative process rather than through coercive 
control of the state and the threat of force (Stigler (1971)). In addition, long after landed 
interests ceased to be a political force, the McFadden Act endured for many decades, as 
new politically influential interest groups, like small community banks, emerged in the 
wake of the act and sought to maintain the status quo. Thus, constituencies can have an 
influence on economic outcomes long after the initial actors have passed from the scene. 
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     T ABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Variables’ Definitions and Sources 
Variable Source  Definition 
Land Inequality 
(Gini Coefficient) 
United States Bureau of 
Census; Inter-University 
Consortium for Political 
and Social Research 
(ICPSR) NOs: 0003, 
0007,0008,0009,0014,0017 
The number of farms are distributed across the following size 
(acres) bins: 3-9; 10-19 acres; 20-49 acres; 50-99 acres; 100-
174;175-259;260-499;500-999; 1000 and above. We use the 
mid point of each bin to construct the Gini coefficient; farms 
above 1000 acres are assumed to be 1000 acres. The Gini 
coefficient is given by 
 
Where farms are ranked in ascending order of size,  , and n 
is the total number of farms, while m is the mean farm size. 
[Atkinson, A.B. (1970)]. At the state level, we sum the total 
number of farms in each bin across counties, then compute 
the Gini coefficient. 
Number of State and National 
Banks Active in each county. 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Data on Banks 
in the United States, 1920-
1936 (ICPSR 07).  
 
 Urban Population; Fraction of 
Black Population; Fraction of 
Population Between 7 and 20 
years; County Area; County 
Population; Value of Crops/ 
Farm Land Divided by Farm 
Population 
United States Bureau of 
Census; Inter-University 
Consortium for Political 
and Social Research 
(ICPSR) NOs: 0003, 
0007,0008,0009,0014,0017 
 
Distance From Mississippi 
River; Atlantic; Pacific and the 
Great Lakes.  
Computed Using ArcView 
from each county’s 
centroid.  
 
Voting Roll Call Data, on 
McFadden Act., Ideology of 
Legislator 
www.voteview.com    
Rainfall (Mean and Standard 
Deviation) 
Weather Source 
10 Woodsom Drive 
Amesbury MA, 0193 
(Data Compiled from the 
National Weather Service 
Cooperative (COOP) 
Network 
The COOP Network consists of more than 20,000 sites across 
the U.S. and has monthly precipitation observations for the 
past 100 years. However, for a station’s data to be included in 
the county level data, the station needs to have a minimum of 
10 years history and minimum data density of 90 percent: 
ratio of number of actual observations to potential 
observations. If one or more candidate stations meet the 
above criteria the stations’ data are averaged to produce the 
county level observations—which we then aggregate further 
up to the congressional district. The arithmetic mean and 
standard deviation of rainfall are computed from the monthly 
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Figure 1. Land Inequality, Box Plots, by Region, 1920 
 
The shaded rectangle represents the interquartile range of the Gini coefficient across districts in 
the region. The range contains the median—the solid line. The ends of the vertical lines extend to 




































































































1               
Basic cereals  -0.446**  1               
Grains and 
Seeds 
-0.048* -0.024  1             
Hay and forage  -0.175*  -0.159**  -0.023  1           
Fruits and Nuts  0.341**  -0.284**  -0.049**  -0.016  1         
Vegetables 0.299** -0.377**  -0.028**  0.063*  0.163**  1       
Average 
Annual rainfall 









0.436** -0.223*  -0.009  0.617**  0.082**  -0.065**  0.498*
* 
0.532** 1 
This table presents the pairwise correlations between land concentration, crop shares, and measures of 
rainfall in the districts. Crop shares are shares of land devoted to the crop within the county as measured in 
the 1920  census. Rainfall is measured over the period 1900-2000. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level 
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Table 3A. McFadden Act Roll Call, February 1926. 
 Full  Sample Available  Sample 
Vote  Number Percent  Number Percent 
     
Yea 289  67  233 66 
Paired  Yea 4  0.9  4 1 
Paired  Nay 3  0.7  2 0.6 
Nay 91 21  84 23 
Present 8 2  8 2 
Not  Voting 32  7  23 6 
Total 427    354  
 
Table 3B. McFadden Act Roll Call, February 1926, By Region 
  New England  Mid Atlantic  East North Central  West North Central 
  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number  Percent 
Yea  19  86 41  76 62  82     33  62 
Paired Yea  1  5 2  4 1  1    
Paired Nay        1 1     
Nay     1   10  13  15  28 
Present     3  6     1  2 
Not Voting  2 2  7 13  2 3  4  8 
Total  22   54   76   53   
 
 
South Border  Mountain  Pacific 
  Number   Percent  Number   Percent  Number   Percent  Number   Percent 
Yea  42 46 17  67  8 80 11  69 
Paired 
Yea 
1 1 9  29       
Paired 
Nay 
            
Nay  46 50    2 20 1 6 
Present  2 2 1  3     1  6 
Not 
Voting 
1 1 4  13     3  19 
Total  92   31    10    16   
A "Pair" occurs when the leaders of the two parties both have members who want to be absent from the 
vote.  If one member would vote “Yea” and the opposite “Nay” then the leadership would "pair" 
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Table 4A. The McFadden Act, The Initial Bill, February 1926. 
Dependent Variable: Nay (1), Voted Yea (0). 
 
 
        
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 


















  (0.109) (0.227)  (0.247)  (0.583) (0.501) 
Per Capita Farm 
Wealth 
   0.0735     
     (0.448)     
Observations 317  317  317  317  317 
R-squared 0.503  0.534  0.543  0.59   
Standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include state 
level indicators. Columns 2-5 also include the distance from the Mississippi River; the Atlantic Ocean; the 
Great Lakes; the Pacific Ocean (all distances in log kilometers); the black population; the illiterate 
population; the  number of  5-17 year olds; the urban population (all expressed as a share of total district 
population); the district area (in log square miles) and population (log) are also included; and the two DW 
nominate scores for the legislator in each district (preference for redistribution and the urban-rural bias as 
in (Poole and Rosenthal (2007)). In column 4, land concentration is instrumented using average rainfall in 
the district. The first stage coefficient estimate for average rainfall  is 0.17 and the t-statistic is 4.03. In 
column 5, we use both average rainfall and its standard deviation in the instrument set. The first stage 
coefficient estimates are 0.09 (p-value 0.04) and 0.12 (p-value=0.01) respectively. The F-Statistic for joint 
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Table 4B. The McFadden Act, The Initial Bill, February 1926. 
Dependent Variable: Nay (1), Voted Yea (0). 
            
VARIABLES  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 














































          
  (0.443)            
Manufacturing  -1.887**            
  (0.795)            
Manufacturing, 
squared 1.145** 
          




  -0.270*           
    (0.160)           
              




     
     (204.8) (205.2)       
Ratio of State 
Bank Deposits 





     




     -1.043       
       (1.671)       
Observations 314  317 317  317  92  225 157  160 
R-squared 0.562 0.538  0.542  0.543 0.272 0.63  0.41  0.74 
Standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include state 
level indicators. All columns include the distance from the Mississippi River; the Atlantic Ocean; the Great 
Lakes; the Pacific Ocean (all distances in log kilometers); the black population; the illiterate population; the  
number of  5-17 year olds; the urban population (all expressed as a share of total district population); the 
district area (in log square miles) and population (log) are also included; and the two DW nominate scores 
for the legislator in each district (preference for redistribution and the urban-rural bias as in (Poole and 
Rosenthal (2007)). The state bank suspension rate is the number of state banks suspended from 1921-1925 
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1        
Mortgage Debt to 
Farm Values 
-0.1845* 1       
Fraction of  
Indebted Farms 




0.0029 0.2473*  0.0975*  1   
Principal Component  -0.6366* 0.7130*  0.7663*  0.3844*  1 
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Table 6A. The McFadden Act, The Initial Bill, 1926 & The Cost & Availability of 
Credit. 
Dependent Variable: Nay (1), Voted Yea (0). OLS Estimates 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
                
Interest Rate  0.201*         
 (0.114)         
Fraction of Indebted Farms    -0.339       
   (0.323)       
Mortgage Debt, as a Share of State 
Bank     0.00504   
 
     (0.0254)     
          
Mortgage Debt as a Share of Farm 
Value       0.00154 
 
       (0.00480)   
Principal Component          -0.0360 
         (0.0394) 
          
          
Observations 316  316  316  316  316 
R-squared 0.531  0.542  0.536  0.531  0.534 
Table 6B. IV Estimates 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
                 
Interest Rate  1.057*          
 (0.566)          
Fraction of Indebted Farms    -2.215**        
   (0.900)        
Mortgage Debt, as a Share of State 
Bank     -0.635*   
  
     (0.341)      
           
Mortgage Debt as a Share of Farm 
Value       -0.0262** 
  
       (0.0109)    
Principal Component          -0.173***  -0.166 
         (0.0648)  (0.125) 
Observations 316  316  316  316  316 316 
R-squared 0.531  0.542  0.536  0.531  0.516 0.58 
           
First  Stage          
           
Land Concentration  0.503  -0.239 -20.24 -0.832  -3.054  
F-Statistic 3.880  22.69  45.38  1.98  86.78  
(p-value) (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)  0.167  (0.00)  
Standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include state 
level indicators. All columns include the distance from the Mississippi River; the Atlantic Ocean; the Great 
Lakes; the Pacific Ocean (all distances in log kilometers); the black population; the illiterate population; the  
number of  5-17 year olds; the urban population (all expressed as a share of total district population); the 
district area (in log square miles) and population (log) are also included; and the two DW nominate scores 
for the legislator in each district (preference for redistribution and the urban-rural bias as in (Poole and 
Rosenthal (2007)). Column 6 instruments the principal component with average rainfall. The first stage 
coefficient for average rainfall (log) is -0.93 (p-value=0.04).    42
Table 7. The McFadden Act, The Final Bill, 1927 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
1927 Roll Call 
Vote 
Nay (1), Voted 
Yea (0) 


























   Hull Amendment (June 26, 1926) 
Land Concentration  -0.356  0.716**  1.068***  -0.231 
 (0.262)  (0.311)  (0.388)  (1.445) 
Land Concentration 
(Log)* 
Tobacco Value Share   
 
9.394** 2.732 
     (4.095) (8.573) 
Tobacco Value Share      7.637** 2.117 
     (3.353) (9.796) 
Tobacco Value Share, 






Observations 294  228  153  56 
R-squared 0.583  0.511  0.567  0.546 
Standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include state 
level indicators. Columns 1-4 also include the distance from the Mississippi River; the Atlantic Ocean; the 
Great Lakes; the Pacific Ocean (all distances in log kilometers); the black population; the illiterate 
population; the  number of  5-17 year olds; the urban population (all expressed as a share of total district 
population); the district area (in log square miles) and population (log) are also included; and the two DW 
nominate scores for the legislator in each district (preference for redistribution and the urban-rural bias 
(Poole and Rosenthal (2007)).The dependent variable in columns 2-4 equal 1 if a congressional district 
switched from a “Nay” in  the 1926 Hull Amendment vote to a “Yea” vote in 1927 and 0 if the vote 
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Table 8. The Impact of the McFadden Act in a  County Level Cross Section. 




















              
Branching 3.125*  4.408**  4.042**  -0.226 
 (1.768)  (1.712)  (1.779)  (0.819) 
        
Observations 2163  2082  2108  2761 
R-squared 0.011  0.031  0.020  0.044 
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the difference between the log of the average number of 
national banks in county i from 1927-1930 and the log number of national banks in 1926 in county i.  
Branching is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a state allowed branching, and 0 otherwise, observed in 
1920. Column 1 also includes the log number of banks in 1926 in county i as a control variable. Column 2 
also includes additional controls include the distance from the Mississippi River; the Atlantic Ocean; the 
Great Lakes; the Pacific Ocean (all distances in log kilometers); the black population; the illiterate 
population; the  number of  5-17 year olds; the urban population (all expressed as a share of total district 
population); the district area (in log square miles) and population (log) are also included; and the two DW 
nominate scores for the legislator in each district (preference for redistribution and the urban-rural bias 
(Poole and Rosenthal (2007)).The dependent variable in column 3 is the difference in the average share of 
national banks in county i computed over the period 1927-1930 relative to the share in 1926. Controls 
include the share of national banks in 1926, as well as the previous geographic and demographic controls in 
column 2. In column 4, the dependent variable is the average of the annual state bank suspension rate over 
the period 1927-1930. The annual state bank suspension rate itself is computed as the ratio of the number 
suspended state banks in the calendar year relative to the total number of state banks the previous year. The 
controls in column 4 include the state bank suspension rate in 1926, as well as the previous demographic 
and geographic controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, * denote significance at 
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